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In the paper I examine in an experiment whether for two diﬀerent
levels of technological spillovers, cooperative R&D behavior voluntar-
ily arises when ﬁrms have communication possibilities. It is assumed
that in the output market, ﬁrms compete ` a la Cournot. Experimen-
tal results indicate that when technological spillovers are complete
and subjects communicate, R&D decisions converge to the coopera-
tive level, while in other cases R&D decisions converge towards the
Nash equilibrium.
JEL codes: C90, L13, O31
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1 Introduction
In recent years research joint ventures have become a widespread accepted
form of cooperation between ﬁrms. US and European antitrust legislation
prohibits ﬁrms to make agreements on selling price and quantity but pro-
vides an exception for agreements that are limited to the pre-competitive
R&D stage. Moreover, R&D cooperation projects are actively supported
and subsidized by many governments in their technology policies. Also in the
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1theoretical industrial organization literature cooperative and non-cooperative
R&D models have received much attention. Examples are d’Aspremont and
Jacquemin (1988); Kamien et al. (1992); Poyago-Theotoky (1995); Leahy and
Neary (1997); Petit and Tolwinski (1999); Hinloopen (2000). In this strand
of literature, the degree of technological spillovers between ﬁrms determines
whether it is welfare-improving that ﬁrms either compete or cooperate in
R&D, given that they compete in the output stage. If spillovers are above
a certain threshold, R&D investment and welfare are higher under R&D co-
operation, while for spillovers below the threshold, R&D competition yields
higher R&D and welfare. This is often viewed as a rationale for govern-
ment stimulation of R&D cooperation in industries characterized by large
technological spillovers.
In the above theoretical models, the emergence of R&D cooperation is
only examined in a fully cooperative context, meaning that the implicit as-
sumption is made that ﬁrms can credibly commit, e.g. in a binding agree-
ment, to the cooperative R&D level. But can R&D cooperation in some
circumstances also be sustainable in a non-cooperative context, as e.g. tacit
price or quantity collusion is under some conditions in oligopoly markets? In
Holt (1995) some examples are given of experiments on oligopoly games in
which non-binding communication tends to increase cooperation. Examples
of other oligopoly pricing games with non-binding communication are Holt
and Davis (1990), Cason (1995) and Harstad et al. (1998). Harstad et al.
(1998) ﬁnd that the announcement of prices leads to higher prices than the
Nash equilibrium, though not as high as the joint proﬁt maximization level.
In Holt and Davis (1990) evidence is found that initially prices increase after
price announcements but that in the end prices return to their initial lower
levels. Cason (1995) comes to a similar conclusion but distinguishes eﬀects
of discrete and continuous signaling. Continuous signaling, where it is op-
tional to send a signal, stimulates cooperation more, which implies that the
simple sending of a signal indicates a willingness to cooperate. Thus, with
an appropriate form of non-binding communication, cooperation in prices or
quantities is higher than without communication.
In this paper an experiment is set up to investigate whether in a non-
cooperative R&D game, assuming Cournot competition in the output stage,
R&D cooperation naturally arises under some conditions. As non-binding
communication has already showed to be eﬀective in raising cooperation in
other oligopoly experiments, I allow for it in part of the treatments. In
the other treatments, subjects do not have any communication possibilities.
Given the importance of the technological spillovers in the theoretical liter-
ature, I ran both treatments for a scenario without spillovers and a scenario
with complete spillovers. Results indicate that communication yields R&D
2levels that are close to the cooperative outcome when technological spillovers
are large, while without spillovers the possibility of communication does not
make a diﬀerence. In the latter case R&D levels converge to the Nash pre-
diction. In the baseline treatments, Nash predictions perform well.
Earlier experiments on R&D behavior contained e.g. patent races (Hey
and Reynolds, 1991; Sbriglia and Hey, 1994) or build on a stochastic inven-
tion model of innovation, in which the probability of producing a practically
relevant innovation depends on the amount of R&D investment of a ﬁrm
(Isaac and Reynolds, 1986, 1988, 1992). In the latter series of experiments,
appropriability is introduced by inducing a distribution of payoﬀs among the
sellers in the experimental markets. In the earliest experiments, this pay-
oﬀ distribution was exogenously determined by the experimenters, while in
the most recent experiment it depended on price and production decisions
of the sellers as ﬁrms also compete in a product market. Main conclusions
are that risk-neutral non-cooperative Nash equilibrium predictors perform
relatively well and that a reduction in appropriability for the innovator leads
to reduced R&D spending by all participants. The experimental results fur-
ther give support to behavior that is deﬁned as Schumpeterian competition,
which is characterized by falling prices as a result of the cost-reducing in-
novations and by non-creative ﬁrms being competed away. Another paper
that addresses the issue of technological spillovers in an R&D experiment is
Jullien and Ruﬃeux (2001). In their experiments ﬁrms could either adopt
an existing technology or develop a new technology with uncertainty over
the outcome and also competed in a product market. It is found that mar-
kets generally are eﬃcient but that convergence of market prices towards
their competitive level is slower in the presence of endogenous shocks, when
all oligopolists gain a cost reduction that shifts the aggregate supply curve
downwards. No inﬂuence of spillovers on R&D incentives has been found.
Finally, in Suetens (2003) R&D behavior of ﬁrms that compete in quantities
and that have binding contract possibilities is examined. Conclusions are
that, irrespective of the level of technological spillovers, committing to an
R&D contract guarantees that R&D decisions are at the cooperative level,
and that in other cases non-cooperative Nash predictions perform well.
The link between spillovers and voluntary incentives to choose coopera-
tive R&D levels, either with or without non-binding communication has not
been addressed in previous experiments. The paper is organized as follows.
In section 2, the model on which the experiment is based, is resumed. Sec-
tion 3 contains the experimental design and analyses of the experimental
results are presented in section 4. In section 5, I elaborate on what has been
communicated and section 6 concludes.
32 Theoretical benchmarks
The model on which the theoretical predictions and benchmarks are based,
is in d’Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988). For our purposes, it is assumed
that perfectly informed ﬁrms in a duopoly simultaneously decide on R&D
in a ﬁrst stage and are engaged in Cournot competition in a second stage.
An industry with two symmetric ﬁrms is considered which are of equal size,
have equal cost functions and produce a homogeneous good. The industry is
characterized by a linear inverse demand function of the form P(Q) = a¡bQ,
with a;b > 0;Q = Q1 + Q2 and Qi is production quantity of ﬁrm i. The
linear unit cost function of ﬁrm i is assumed to be decreasing in its amount
of ‘eﬀective’ R&D, Xi, (Kamien et al., 1992) which is composed of its own
R&D, xi, and spilled over R&D of ﬁrm j, ¯xj. The spillover parameter ¯ is
between 0 and 1 and determines how much ﬁrm i can take advantage of the
other ﬁrm’s R&D expenditures without bearing any cost. Unit cost of ﬁrm i
assumed to be linearly decreasing in its amount of eﬀective R&D and thus is
ci(Xi) = ®¡°Xi with ° > 0;® < a. Further, R&D investments are assumed
to have decreasing returns, which is implemented in the model in the form
of a quadratic R&D cost function1 fi(xi) = ±
x2
i
2 with ± > 0.
The two-stage game is solved by backward induction. In the second
stage ﬁrms individually maximize their proﬁt with respect to their production
quantity. Maximizing proﬁt of ﬁrm i, ¼i = P(Q)Qi ¡ ci(Xi)Qi ¡ fi(xi), for
i = 1;2 and replacing production quantities by their maximizing values yields










8i = 1;2; j 6= i: (1)
In the ﬁrst stage ﬁrms maximize their proﬁt with respect to R&D which
yields the following (symmetric) equilibrium R&D level2:
x
¤ =
2°(a ¡ ®)(2 ¡ ¯)
9b± ¡ 2°2(1 + ¯)(2 ¡ ¯)
8i = 1;2: (2)
The subgame perfect Nash prediction of the one-shot and the ﬁnitely repeated
static R&D game, assuming Cournot competition in the output market, is
1In Amir (2000) a model with decreasing returns to own R&D — i.e. the AJ model —
is compared with one with decreasing returns to eﬀective R&D. In the latter case, instead
of deﬁning unit cost as a linear function of eﬀective R&D and R&D cost as a quadratic
function of R&D, unit costs are a square root function of R&D and R&D cost is the
decision variable.
2The second-order condition is 9b± > 2°2(2 ¡ ¯)2.
4x¤. For the most widely separated levels of technological spillovers, i.e. ¯ = 0
and ¯ = 13, and parameter values a = 250, b = 5, ® = 100, ° = 2 and ± = 54




5:74 : ¯ = 0
2:87 : ¯ = 1
Another theoretical benchmark arises when ﬁrms coordinate their R&D




i with xi > 0, should be solved for i =
1;2, which results in the following unique outcome for R&D6:
x
¤¤ =
2°(a ¡ ®)(1 + ¯)
9b± ¡ 2°2(1 + ¯)2 8i = 1;2: (3)




2:76 : ¯ = 0
6:22 : ¯ = 1:
3 Experimental procedure
To focus on the R&D decisions made by the ﬁrms, in the experiment the
quantity decision is controlled by setting production quantity at its Nash-
Cournot equilibrium which is a function of ﬁrms’ R&D expenditures. This
is justiﬁed because European and American antitrust laws forbid ﬁrms to
collude in the output market. Besides, in this way I avoid testing optimization
in both stages (R&D and production) and backward induction. Thus, the
experiment concentrates on the R&D stage that is nested in the more general
two-stage game.
The experiment consisted of three computerized experimental sessions
with a total of 46 participants, recruited from undergraduate economics
courses and divided into ﬁxed groups of two (duopolies). 20 students par-
ticipated in the treatments without technological spillovers and 26 in the
treatments with spillovers. The students were not informed about the iden-
tity of their competitor. Each of the sessions took less than 80 minutes. In
3In the experiment cases without and with full spillovers are used to sharpen possible
contrasts in the results (Friedman and Sunder, 1994).
4The parameter values satisfy requirements of stability as proposed by Henriques (1990)
and correspond to symmetric R&D solutions (see Salant and Shaﬀer, 1998).
5In Kamien et al. (1992) this form of R&D cooperation is called cartelization.
6The second-order condition is 9b± > 2°2(5¯2 ¡ 8¯ + 5).
5the experiment subjects were told that they participated in an experiment
on decision-making in ﬁrms. More speciﬁcally, the subjects were told that
they were sellers in a market with two sellers of a non-speciﬁed product.
They had common knowledge about the fact that they were all subject to
the same conditions related to demand and costs. The subjects had to make
(non-speciﬁed) investment decisions in the interval of [0;25]7 during 27 pe-
riods, which decreased their unit production cost — according to the linear
unit cost function — and which induced a certain cost — calculated on the
basis of the quadratic R&D cost function. This decision inﬂuenced proﬁt
also via equilibrium production quantities. In the complete spillovers case,
subjects were told that their R&D decision also decreased unit production
cost of the other producer in his/her market, without the latter bearing any
cost. Subjects were able to simulate their production quantity, selling price,
unit production cost, total R&D cost and proﬁt on the basis of their own
decision and the other producer’s decision. Each period took around two
minutes, except the ﬁrst one which took longer to let subjects become ac-
quainted with the instructions and the computer program. For participating
and following the instructions carefully they received 100 Belgian francs (2.5
EUR). What they would earn on top of this was related to the sum of the
proﬁts they made in the experiments in all except the ﬁrst periods, which
in turn depended on their own and their competitors’ decisions. They were
told that they would earn on average 400 Belgian francs (around 10 EUR).
For both spillover levels I allowed for the possibility of ‘cheap talk’ com-
munication in part of the duopolies (in 5 for ¯ = 0 and in 8 for ¯ = 1). In
these duopolies, subjects were asked to send messages each period to their
competitors with an indication of the interval — which could be a number or
the maximum interval of [0;25] — in which their decision would be situated
in the considered period. Communicating the interval [0;25] should be in-
terpreted as an unwillingness to communicate, so in our experiment subjects
always have an option not to communicate. This resembles the continuous
signaling treatment in Cason (1995). Since the communication is not binding,
the theoretical prediction is the Nash R&D level.
As such, four treatments were run. That is ‘no chat’ and ‘chat’ for techno-
logical spillovers of 0 and 1. Sixteen subjects were appointed to the treatment
with spillovers and communication possibilities and ten subjects to each of
the other treatments.
7This interval was necessary to obtain positive values for unit production cost.
64 Experimental results
In the experiment, observations within the duopolies are not independent,
since duopolists are or could be inﬂuenced by their competitor’s behavior in
making their R&D decisions. Using the sum of R&D decisions by duopoly in
all analyses, circumvents this problem and creates independent observations
per duopoly. The sum of R&D decisions by duopoly is called X. Period 0
is ignored such that for each subject, the time series amounts to 26 periods.
As the theoretical outcomes (the Nash and cooperative R&D level) are sym-
metric, the theoretical duopoly outcomes are twice the individual outcomes.
Table 1 represents the duopoly Nash (*) and cooperative (**) R&D levels.
¯ = 0 ¯ = 1
X¤ 11.48 5.74
X¤¤ 5.53 12.44
Table 1: Theoretical duopoly R&D benchmarks
In ﬁgure 1 a box plot of averages of the R&D decisions of each duopoly
over all 26 periods is presented. Data of each of the 4 treatments are grouped.
The box in the plot represents the inter quartile range of the data and the
whiskers represent the highest and lowest values excluding outliers and ex-
treme values. The dotted line is the median. Extreme values are deﬁned as
observations that are more than 3 box lengths from the upper or lower edge
of the box. One duopoly in the treatment with ¯ = 0 and without chat or
contract possibilities is identiﬁed as an extreme value (marked with a star).
It is observed that in the no-spillover treatments, either with or with-
out communication possibilities, the medians of the average duopoly R&D
decisions are quite close to the Nash equilibrium prediction. In the com-
plete spillover treatments the medians of R&D decisions in both treatments
are not that similar. Without communication, they are close to the Nash
equilibrium, while with communication they are closer to the cooperative
level. With communication and spillovers a high variance in R&D decisions
is observed though. Summarizing, at ﬁrst sight the non-cooperative commu-
nication possibilities seem not to make a diﬀerence in R&D behavior when
no technological spillovers exist and Nash equilibrium predictions perform
quite well. With spillovers, R&D levels are closer to the cooperative level
when cheap talk is allowed compared to when it is not allowed.
I further compared average R&D decisions of the duopolies in the last
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Figure 1: Boxplot
Between Within
¯ = 0 ¯ = 1 ¯ = 0 ¯ = 1
z -0.104 -1.464 -1.604 -1.753
exact sig. (2-tailed) 1.000 0.171 0.250 0.126
exact sig. (1-tailed) 0.500 0.086 0.125 0.063
Table 2: Mann-Whitney and Wilcoxon signed ranks test results
treatments without any contract or communication possibilities, using Mann-
Whitney tests. Results of these tests are in table 2, in the part under the
header ‘Between’. The null hypothesis is that R&D decisions without com-
munication possibilities do not diﬀer from R&D decisions with communi-
cation possibilities. For the treatments without technological spillovers, no
statistically signiﬁcant diﬀerence is found between ‘chat’ and ‘no chat’. In
the case of complete spillovers some evidence for a diﬀerence between ‘chat’
and ‘no chat’ is found, when relying on one-tailed test results and using a
10% signiﬁcance level. In this case the alternative hypothesis would be that
R&D levels with chat are higher than those without chat if it is expected
that communication possibilities would stimulate R&D cooperation. But
statistical evidence is not that overwhelming to make clear-cut conclusions
regarding the eﬀect of communication at this stage.
In the Mann-Whitney tests it is not taken into account whether sub-
jects have actually used the communication possibilities. In another series
8of tests, reported in the same table under the header ‘Within’, I have cor-
rected for this. The results are those of Wilcoxon signed ranks tests of dif-
ferences between average R&D levels within the communication treatments
when communication possibilities have actually been used by both subjects
in a duopoly and R&D levels averaged over periods in which these possibil-
ities have not been used. Again, only observations in the last ten periods
were used to compute averages. Note that the number of sent messages in
duopolies with technological spillovers does not signiﬁcantly diﬀer from the
scenario without spillovers. Results are very similar to those of the Mann-
Whitney tests. Thus, for complete spillovers some evidence exists that R&D
levels are higher if subjects communicate intervals in which the R&D decision
will be (with 10% signiﬁcance). With respect to the no-spillover treatment,
it is found that no diﬀerences in R&D decisions arise between R&D decisions
in periods with and without communication. On the basis of non-parametric
tests it is possible to compare observations between and within treatments.
In what follows an econometric analysis is performed to compare the exper-
imental R&D decisions with the Nash and cooperative outcomes.
The data are structured in a way, in which non-parametric tests ignore
important information about the dynamic structure of the data (K¨ onigstein,
2000). Indeed, for each duopoly a time series exists covering 26 periods of
R&D investment decisions, ignoring period 0. That is why in what follows
I use econometric techniques to further analyze the data. To be able to
compare the experimental R&D decisions with the theoretical competitive
and cooperative equilibrium R&D decisions, it is necessary to estimate an
equilibrium value of the experimental R&D decisions. For this purpose I
estimate the following equation8
Xk;l;t = ¸k0 + ¸k1Xk;l;t¡1 + ¸k2Xk;l;t¡2 + ²k;l;t; (4)
with ²k;l;t following a white noise process. An estimate for the long-term
equilibrium µk is computed as follows: µk = ¸k0=(1 ¡ ¸k1 ¡ ¸k2). The series
is stationary and thus converges if j¸k1j < 1, j¸k2j < 1, ¸k1 + ¸k2 < 1 and
¸k2 ¡ ¸k1 < 1 (Greene, 2000).
For each of the treatments I have estimated a model as in (4). The choice
of 2 lags in the autoregressive process is rather arbitrary, although with
8As in Mason and Phillips (1997) it is assumed that the R&D decision of each duopoly
and in each period is equal to the sum of a static long-term equilibrium value, which is
constant and thus not subject- nor time-speciﬁc (µk), and a subject- and time-speciﬁc
random or residual ﬂuctuation (uk;l;t). I.e., Xk;l;t = µk + uk;l;t, where k represents the
treatment, l the duopoly and t the period. This assumption combined with the assumption
that a pair’s R&D decisions are correlated with R&D decisions in previous periods, i.e.
that the residuals follow an AR(2) process (uk;l;t = ¸k1uk;l;t¡1+¸k2uk;l;t¡2+²k;l;t), yields
the above econometric equation.
9no chat chat
¯ = 0 ¯ = 1 ¯ = 0 ¯ = 1
ˆ ¸k0 3.64 [.000] 1.77 [.000] ˆ ¸0
k0 9.83 [.000] 0.18 [.658]
ˆ ¸k1 0.35 [.000] 0.47 [.000] ˆ ¸0
k1 0.25 [.009] 0.68 [.000]
ˆ ¸k2 0.28 [.000] 0.20 [.000] ˆ ¸0
k2 0.02 [.843] 0.20 [.000]
ˆ ¸1
k0 -1.64 [.022] 1.54 [.002]
ˆ ¸1
k1 -0.09 [.144] 0.01 [.858]
ˆ ¸1
k2 0.10 [.057] -0.03 [.281]
ˆ µk 9.86 (0.39) 5.36 (0.40) ˆ µ0
k 13.47 (1.07) 1.51 (3.05)
ˆ µ1
k 11.40 (0.30) 12.32 (1.12)
GOF (a) 0.16 0.85 GOF (a) 0.24 0.47
Durbin-h(b) 1 2 Durbin-h(b) 0 1
N*T 5*24 5*24 N*T 5*24 8*24
P-values are in square brackets and standard errors in round brackets.
ˆ µk without outlier in T00 is 11.94 (0.25) and GOF is 0.39.
(a) Greene (2000).
(b) Number of duopolies with autocorrelation with ® = 0:05.
Table 3: Econometric results
2 lags one should in general be able to correct for possible autocorrelation
problems without losing too many degrees of freedom. As statistical evidence
has been found for diﬀerences within the communication treatments in the
sense that it mattered whether communication possibilities have actually
been used by the subjects, a dummy is included in the econometric equations.
This dummy is equal to one if an interval has been sent in that period by
both subjects in the duopoly and equal to zero otherwise. As to allow for
diﬀerent slopes, interactions between the dummy and the right-hand-side
variables (i.e. the lagged R&D decisions) are also included. As it is assumed
that all parameters are the same across the cross-sectional observation units
(duopolies per treatment), it is likely that some cross-sectional correlation
exists. Moreover, based on the inspection of the variances of the diﬀerent
duopoly decisions within the treatments, cross-sectional heteroskedasticity is
also likely. Thus, feasible GLS is applied without imposing restrictions on
cross-sectional heteroskedasticity and correlation. In table 3 the econometric
results are given.
The superscripts 0 and 1 in the second part of the table refer to the usual
parameter estimates and the estimates taking into account the dummy, re-
spectively. The sums of ˆ ¸0
ki and ˆ ¸1
ki for i = 0;1;2 are used to compute
respectively the constant term and the slopes when communication possi-
bilities are used, while when no communication possibilities are used, the
10constant term and the slopes are respectively ˆ ¸0
ki for i = 0;1;2. As tests
indicated possible within-heteroskedasticity for some equations, standard er-
rors were estimated heteroskedastic-consistently. The standard errors of the
static long-run equilibria have been calculated according to corollary 4.2.2. in
Fomby et al. (1984). For each equation a Durbin-h-statistic has been calcu-
lated and the number of times the null hypothesis of no autocorrelation has
been rejected, is put under the row header ‘Durbin-h’. The autocorrelation
problems in some of the duopolies possibly are the consequence of restricting
the parameter to be the same across duopolies in each treatment. Removing
the outlier in treatments ‘no spillover, no chat’ yielded estimates that are
closer to Nash predictions. From the table we learn that it is not always the
case that the two lags of the dependent variable signiﬁcantly diﬀer from zero.
We do keep the two lags though, as for ﬁnal estimates to be comparable. It
further seems that the dummies are highly signiﬁcant in most cases, which
indicates that diﬀerences exist within the communication treatments between
R&D levels of subjects that have used the communication possibilities and
those that have not used them.
Further, the estimated static long-run R&D decisions (ˆ µk) are compared
with the theoretical predictions in table 1 using t-tests as to test the hy-
potheses formulated in the previous section. Table 4 contains the results of
these t-tests. The superscripts 0 and 1 in the table again refer to estimates
without and estimates with dummies.
spillover = 0 spillover = 1
no chat chat no chat chat
H0: µ0
k = X¤ -4.16++ 1.92 -0.96 -1.39
H0: µ0
k = X¤¤ 11.03++ 7.66++ -17.66++ -3.59++
H0: µ1
k = X¤ - -0.26 - 5.90++
H0: µ1
k = X¤¤ - 19.86++ - -0.11
Without the outlier, the t-values are respectively 1.87 and 26.10.
instead of -4.16 and 11.03.
++H0 is rejected with ® = 0:05 (critical t value is 1.98).
Table 4: Results of t-tests
From the t-tests it can be concluded that R&D behavior of subjects with
complete spillovers and no communication possibilities does not signiﬁcantly
diﬀer from competitive Nash behavior. In the no-spillovers case, this con-
clusion can only be made when the outlier is ignored. With communication
possibilities, R&D behavior does neither signiﬁcantly diﬀer from competi-
tive Nash behavior without spillovers, irrespective of whether intervals are
11actually sent. With spillovers, it does matter whether communication pos-
sibilities have actually been used by subjects. Indeed, only for those cases
in which messages have been sent, no statistically signiﬁcant diﬀerence is
found between R&D levels in the experiment and cooperative R&D levels.
The R&D level that corresponds to behavior of non-communicating subjects
does not signiﬁcantly diﬀer from the Nash prediction, mainly because of it’s
high variance (see table 3). Thus, the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium
predicts R&D behavior well for treatments without technological spillovers,
either with or without communication. R&D behavior in periods in which
intervals were communicated in the treatment with technological spillovers,
is cooperative.
To summarize, when no technological spillovers are present, subjects need
more ‘bindingness’ than simple sharing intentions about R&D decisions as
to deviate from the Nash R&D level and to converge to the cooperative level
(cfr. Suetens, 2003). When R&D investment is characterized by complete
technological spillovers, the sending of messages containing intended R&D
investment suﬃces for R&D behavior to be cooperative.
A ﬁrst plausible explanation for the diﬀerence between R&D behavior
without and with spillovers in the non-cooperative communication treatment
can be looked for in non-cooperative theory of inﬁnitely repeated games
(Friedman, 1971; Martin, 1993). If strategies were followed as if the game
was an inﬁnitely repeated game9, it matters whether a large diﬀerence exist
between the maximum proﬁt that would be gained when defecting compared
to the proﬁt that would be gained when cooperating for several periods.
If the discount factor that subjects use to calculate the present value of
their expected future proﬁts is below a certain threshold, which is a function
of the diﬀerence between maximum proﬁt when defecting and cooperative
proﬁt, such a strategy is a non-cooperative equilibrium. This threshold is
equal to (¼¤¤ ¡ ¼¤)=(ˆ ¼ ¡ ¼¤¤) where ˆ ¼ is the proﬁt that is gained when a
ﬁrm maximizes own proﬁt, assuming that the other chooses the joint proﬁt
maximizing level. If the threshold is higher under complete spillovers than
without spillovers, subjects in the former treatments will cooperate easier
than subjects in the latter. In the parameter settings of the experiment the
threshold for both treatments is 0.96 which implies that incentives of ﬁrms to
cooperate are expected to be the same for both spillover levels. Thus, if the
game is viewed as an inﬁnitely repeated game, cooperation is as likely to be a
viable strategy for complete spillovers as it is for the model without spillovers.
9An example is a trigger strategy, where a ﬁrm in duopoly chooses to cooperate until
the end of the game, if the other also chooses to cooperate. If one ﬁrm defects, the other
will also choose to compete.
12Thus, an explanation for the diﬀerence in behavior in both treatments should
be sought elsewhere.
Secondly, compare the R&D game to a public goods/bads game. Public
goods games and R&D games with high spillovers are characterized by posi-
tive externalities, since an action of one subject increases proﬁt of other sub-
jects. In public bad games and R&D games with low spillovers the opposite
is valid as an action of one subject leads to a decline in proﬁt of the other sub-
jects such that negative externalities appear. Experiments on public goods
typically yield higher levels of cooperation than their public bad equivalents
(Andreoni, 1995; Oﬀerman, 1996; Willinger and Ziegelmeyer, 1999; Cookson,
2000; Park, 2000), which in this context is often referred to as a framing ef-
fect. My ﬁndings coincide to some extent with these results, at least when
subjects communicate. I would not call the eﬀect a framing eﬀect, though,
since the no-spillovers and the full-spillovers game are not symmetric in the
sense that they have diﬀerently sloping reaction curves. Public goods and
bads games are both characterized by a horizontal reaction curve.
A third explanation is a rather intuitive one and related to this. Reaction
curves have a negative slope when ¯ = 0 and a positive slope when ¯ = 1,
since R&D decisions are strategic substitutes when ¯ < 0:5 and strategic
complements when ¯ > 0:5 (Kamien et al., 1992; Hinloopen, 2000). Thus,
without spillovers, the best response of a ﬁrm to an increase in R&D of
the competitor, is to decrease it’s own R&D. This could hamper the forma-
tion of cooperative agreements10. With high spillovers, the opposite eﬀect
plays. A theoretical paper on the relation between strategic complemen-
tarity/substitutability, externalities and ambiguity is Eichberger and Kelsey
(2002). Ambiguity, referring to “situations in which individuals have to
make decisions when the relevant probabilities are unknown”, would decrease
eﬀorts or actions. Since in non-cooperative games with strategic substi-
tutes (complements) and negative (positive) externalities, Nash equilibrium
predictions are higher (lower) than Pareto superior cooperative outcomes,
this would imply that if ambiguity were present, in no-spillover (complete
spillover) games, R&D decisions would be biased towards cooperative (com-
petitive) levels. Since I found evidence for competitive R&D behavior in the
no-spillover treatments, the presence of ambiguity is quite unlikely. With
spillover levels of one, ambiguity neither is likely in the presence of commu-
nication. Without communication, behavior in the experiments is competi-
tive, which theoretically provides an argument for the existence of ambiguity.
But since the set-up in this treatment is the same as in the other treatments,
it can be assumed that ambiguity neither is present. In any case, possi-
10I thank Jan Potters for suggesting this.
13ble diﬀerences in behavior when actions are strategic substitutes or strategic
complements is a topic that requires some further (experimental) research.
5 Communication
As to further investigate why chatting was successful in achieving coopera-
tive R&D levels with full spillovers and why it was not without spillovers,
in this section I take a closer look at what exactly has been communicated
by the subjects. In table 5 data are given on the communicated intervals
and their contents. The data refer to numbers of observed intervals and are
aggregated in time and across duopolies. Remark that for small intervals it
is less likely that they contain either the Nash or the cooperative R&D level,
while one of the two bounds can still be very close to either of the R&D
levels. If ignoring these communicative messages, the communicative extent
of the messages would be underestimated. To correct for this, the smaller
intervals were enlarged. Moreover, for the intervals of which the diﬀerence
between the upper bound and the lower bound was strictly smaller than 2,
lower (upper) bounds were recalculated by subtracting (adding) 0.511. If it is
assumed that communication of the interval [0;25] represents an unwilling-
ness to communicate, only intervals not equal to [0;25] should be considered
when investigating the communicative contents of the chats. In the ﬁrst part
of the table the data are divided into intervals equal and not equal to [0;25].
Slightly more (though not statistically signiﬁcant) unwillingness to commu-
nicate is observed in the no-spillovers treatment than in the full-spillovers
treatment. Furthermore, the by far largest part of the communicated in-
tervals [0;25] (about 85 out of 108) for ¯ = 1 comes from two out of eight
duopolies. The intervals [0;25] in the no-spillovers treatment come almost
exclusively from three out of ﬁve duopolies.
In the second part of the table, the communicated intervals are further
subdivided into four groups, i.e. whether they do not contain the theoretical
Nash nor the cooperative R&D decision, whether they contain both, whether
they only contain the Nash R&D equilibrium and whether they only contain
the cooperative R&D equilibrium. For both spillover levels, the share of
intervals not containing any equilibrium is quite high, which could be an
indication that communication occasionally is simple ‘babbling’. For both
spillover treatments, the majority of these messages diﬀer a lot from the co-
11A total of 213 intervals out of 676 were re-scaled. Note that the original size (upper
minus lower bound) of only 2 out of these 213 intervals was between 1 and 2. This implies
that only those two were re-scaled to a size slightly larger than 2. As such, the ‘new’ size
of most intervals, i.e. 211, was still smaller than or equal to 1.
14spillover = 0 spillover = 1
interval= [0;25] 84 32% 108 26%
concentration 41(a) 16% 85(b) 20%
82(c) 32%
interval6= [0;25] 176 68% 308 74%
total 260 100% 416 100%
x¤;x¤¤ = 2 interval 73 41% 150 49%
x¤;x¤¤ 2 interval 2 1% 16 5%
only x¤ 2 interval 79 45% 19 6%
only x¤¤ 2 interval 22 12% 123 40%
total 176 100% 308 100%
(a) 1 out of 5 duopolies.
(b) 2 out of 8 duopolies.
(c) 3 out of 5 duopolies.
Table 5: Descriptives on communicated intervals
operative R&D level. For ¯ = 1 they are usually higher than the equilibrium
cooperative R&D level. The percentage of intervals containing both, Nash
and cooperative R&D levels, is very low for both spillover levels.
Concentrating on intervals that are informative, in the treatment without
spillovers 45% of the intervals only contains the Nash R&D prediction, while
12% only contains the optimal cooperative R&D level. In the treatment with
spillovers the opposite is observed, i.e. 40% only contains the cooperative
equilibrium and 6% the Nash. This would suggest that either the ability to
ﬁnd the cooperative R&D level or the willingness to cooperate is higher with
spillovers compared to without spillovers, which coincides with the results in
the previous section. Whether the diﬀerence in communicating competitive
and cooperative intervals between both spillover treatments is statistically
signiﬁcant, has been tested by Mann-Whitney tests. The null hypothesis
that the number of times an interval contains the competitive R&D level
is equal for ¯ = 0 and ¯ = 1 is rejected against the alternative hypothesis
that it is higher for ¯ = 0 than for ¯ = 1 with a signiﬁcance level of 1%
(p-value is 0.003). Further, the null hypothesis that the number of times an
interval contains the cooperative R&D level is equal for ¯ = 1 and ¯ = 0 is
only rejected with a signiﬁcance level of 10% (p-value is 0.088) against the
alternative hypothesis that it is higher for ¯ = 1 than for ¯ = 0.
To summarize, if intervals were communicated, they often contained rel-
evant information about intended R&D behavior. With spillovers, intended
R&D levels were generally closer to the cooperative level, while without
15spillovers to the Nash level. This could indicate that the observed coopera-
tive R&D behavior in the non-cooperative treatment with communication is
a result of having communicated ‘cooperative intervals’.
6 Conclusion and remarks
In the paper I investigated in an experiment whether ﬁrms in duopoly com-
pete or cooperate in R&D under two modes of agreement possibilities and for
two levels of technological spillovers, assuming Cournot competition in the
output market. The experiment included a treatment without any communi-
cation or contract possibilities, a treatment with non-binding communication
possibilities and a treatment with binding contract possibilities for each of
the spillover levels (0 and 1).
Competing in R&D is the game theoretical prediction of behavior in the
ﬁnitely repeated game with or without non-binding communication possi-
bilities. In the treatments without communication possibilities, Nash R&D
behavior prevailed for the scenarios with and without technological spillovers.
In the case of complete spillovers, behavior in periods in which messages have
actually been sent, converged to R&D cooperation. Without spillovers, Nash
behavior prevailed also in the communication treatment. Thus, results sup-
port to some extent that when spillovers are high enough, ﬁrms have more
incentives to choose cooperative R&D levels compared to when spillovers
are low in a non-cooperative environment. If no technological spillovers
are present, subjects need more ‘bindingness’ than simple sharing intentions
about R&D decisions as to deviate from the Nash R&D level and to con-
verge to the cooperative level (cfr. Suetens, 2003). For R&D investment
subject to high technological spillovers, the sending of messages containing
intended R&D investment suﬃces for R&D behavior to be cooperative. An
interpretation of these results could be that in industries characterized by
high technological spillovers, government stimulation of R&D cooperation
through contracts is not necessary when ﬁrms’ representatives or R&D man-
agers communicate or meet, as cooperation in R&D then arise in a natural
way.
Our results also coincide to some extent with earlier found evidence in
public goods experiments that with positive (negative) externalities, which
imply that actions increase (decrease) proﬁts of all parties, subjects con-
tribute more (less) to the public good and thus cooperate more (less). Re-
lated to this is the issue of strategic properties of actions. It is left for further
research whether diﬀerences in cooperation levels are dependent of actions
being strategic substitutes or complements.
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